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By Holger Ho¨fling1 and Larry Wasserman2
Stanford University and Carnegie Mellon University
There are no small coincidences and big coincidences! There are only
coincidences!
From “The Statue” episode of Seinfeld.
1. Introduction. Andrey Feuerverger has undertaken a serious challenge.
The subject matter is controversial and finding a sensible way to formulate
the problem in a rigorous statistical manner is difficult.
The paper is notable for its thoroughness. We have rarely seen a paper
on an applied problem that provides so much background material. Most
importantly, the author is very careful to document all his assumptions and
to remind the reader that the conclusion is sensitive to these assumptions. He
resists the temptation to present his results in a sensationalistic way. Rather,
he conveys his analysis in a dispassionate, understated tone. Nonetheless, he
could still end up on Oprah.
We are trying to assess the probability of a hypothesis when the hypothesis
is formed after seeing the data. This is a notoriously difficult problem. As
Feuerverger notes, coincidences are common. But just how common?
One response—the nihilistic approach—is to say that it is impossible and
stop there. We have much sympathy with the nihilists in a problem like
this. Perhaps the scientifically honorable path is to say that any answer
is misleading so it is better to provide no answer. But ultimately this is
unsatisfying and we accept the author’s approach to provide an analysis
with many caveats.
The question may be framed formally as follows. We observe an outcome
x—a tomb with interesting names—and we want to know: is this outcome
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surprising? One way to quantify surprisingness is to perform the following
steps:
1. Construct a sample space X that contains x.
2. Identify all the outcomes A that would have been considered surprising
if they had been observed.
3. Construct an appropriate null distribution P0.
4. Compute the p-value p= P0(A).
The most difficult step is identifying the set A of interesting outcomes. It
is explicitly counterfactual to ask if an outcome would have been surprising
if it had occurred, knowing that it did not occur.
2. Feuerverger’s approach. What the author has proposed is both inter-
esting and reasonable. Numerous judgement calls have to be made but they
have been carefully documented. Our summary of Feuerverger’s method is
this: The sample space is chosen to be sets of names on ossuaries, subject to
some restrictions. The null measure is essentially random sampling from an
onomasticon. The author defines a statistic (RR) that maps sets of names
into products of numbers. These numbers are essentially sample proportions,
modified to take into account various nuances such as surprisingness of ver-
sions of names. The result is a very small p-value suggesting that the find is
indeed surprising.
The ‘Mariamenou ηMara’ inscription has a very big effect on Feuerverger’s
RR statistics. An explanation for this is that the RR statistic becomes more
significant if broad name categories are being subdivided into special name
renditions, even if the particular name renditions are not relevant. The fol-
lowing example illustrates this point:
A population has three names A, B and C each with frequency 1/3. A has
2 name renditions A1 (1/3 of A) and A2 (2/3 of A). Our family has two
members named A and B, and A1 and A2 are both relevant. The uncovered
tomb has one inscription A1. When only considering broad name categories,
we have RR(A) = 1/3, RR(B) = 1/3 and RR(C) = 0. When the null is random
drawing from the population, the p-value is then 2/3.
When taking name renditions into account, RR(A1) = 1/9, RR(A2) = 2/9,RR(B) =
1/3 and RR(C) = 0 giving p-value of 1/9. The p-value decreased although both
name renditions were considered relevant. The change in p-value can be even
more substantial in more complicated cases.
In this comment, we present a Frequentist and a Bayesian approach that do
not have this problem and yield quite different results.
3. A different approach. We would like to consider a different way of
defining the basic event A. Our approach is more expansive and, as a result,
more conservative. Instead of asking “What is the probability of getting this
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set of names?” we ask “What is the probability of getting some interesting
set of names if one looks at several tombs?”
Let X be all name sets. Examples of sample points in X are
x= {Salome},
x= {Levi, Hanan, Simon, Mariam},
x= {Joseph, Jesus, Sarah},
and so on. Define a list of target names S. The list should include all names
that will spark interest. We take this to be either the big set
S = {Mariam, Mary, Salome, James, Joseph, Joanna, Martha}
or the small set
S = {Mariam, Mary, Salome, James, Joseph}.
The name “Jesus” is not included because we will treat it separately. We
assume that a tomb would have triggered interest if its name set B has
sufficient overlap with S. We lump together different version of names since
interested observers would surely argue that a tomb is interesting if there is
any way at all of matching the found names to potentially interesting names.
Denote the name sets in the tombs by B1, . . . ,BN . Say that Bi is interesting
if
|Bi ∩ S| ≥ 3 and “Jesus” ∈Bi.
We denote the probability of this event by pii. Assuming independence of
name assignments in and across tombs, the p-value is
p= 1−
N∏
i=1
(1− q(ni, pii))
where ni is the number of ossuaries in tomb Bi,
q(ni, pi) = pJP(Yi ≥ 3), Yi ∼ Binomial(ni − 1, ν),
ν is the probability that a single name drawn at random is in S and piJ is
the probability of drawing the name “Jesus.” We do not take piJ to be the
probability of drawing “Jesus son of Joseph” because the tomb could have
been considered interesting if it had only said “Jesus.”
For our calculations we take N = 100, ni = 6. The number 100 comes from
the fact that there are about 1000 tombs but only 10 percent have been
excavated. Hence pii = pi does not vary with i. We consider two possibilities
for the male-femail ratio: (i) equal or (ii) unequal as represented by the
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onomasticon. For example, in case S is equal to the first (big) choice, the
male/female ratio is equal we get
ν =
1
2
(
231 + 103 + 45
2509
)
+
1
2
(
81 + 63+ 21+ 12
317
)
= 0.3547.
The value of pi and p for the different combinations of assumptions is as
follows:
S m/f ratio pi p-value
big equal 0.005 0.393
big not equal 0.002 0.183
small equal 0.003 0.290
small not equal 0.002 0.158
We reiterate that we have not treated name variations as special. But
the calculation is invariant under splitting names into subcategories since
we are finding the probability of a set of interesting names, not a particular
name. We also ignored family structure. We now consider two variations.
We consider replacing “Jesus” with “Jesus son of Joseph” by multiplying
these two probabilities. We also consider taking N = 1000 to reflect the
unobserved tombs. The results are:
N = 100 N = 1000
Jesus 0.16 0.82
Jesus son of Joseph 0.01 0.13
There is one case where the p-value is small. But the lack of robustness
of this result does not make us confident in reporting a small p-value.
We conclude that the observed event is not rare at all. The chance that
an observer would find a tomb that could be said to contain interesting
target names is large. This is due to the fact that the interesting names are
common and that the many tombs provide many opportunities for apparent
surprises.
4. Bayesian analysis. Now we consider a Bayesian analysis of the prob-
lem. We need to compute
P (θ = 1|x) =
P (x|θ = 1)P (θ = 1)
P (x|θ = 1)P (θ = 1) +P (x|θ = 0)P (θ = 0)
,
where x denotes the data, θ = 1 that the tomb is from the NT family and
θ = 0 that the tomb is from the normal population.
In the frequentist approach, a partial ordering has to be defined on the
space of all outcomes. Feuerverger does this using the RR statistic and the
approach described above uses intersection of name sets. However, discerning
the exact ordering on the space of outcomes may be hard or people might not
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agree with it. The advantage of the Bayesian approach is that the alternative
distribution only has to be defined at the point x and no ordering on the
space of possible outcomes is needed.
4.1. Posterior probability. Let us introduce a little more notation at
this point. Let c be the configuration of a tomb, g be its genealogy, n =
(n1, . . . , nK) the broad name categories and r = (r1, . . . , rK) the particular
name renditions. Assuming that every name rendition only depends on θ
and its broad name category, we can write
P (x|θ) = P (c, g|θ)P (n|g, c, θ)
K∏
i=1
P (ri|ni, θ).
Simplifying assumptions: To make the computations easier, we make two
more assumptions:
1. The configuration and genealogy we expect to see in the NT family tomb
is not different from the rest of the population, that is, P (c, g|θ =NT ) =
P (c, g|θ = P ).
2. The particular name renditions we expect to see in the NT family tomb
are no different than what we expect to see in the rest of the popula-
tion, that is, P (ri|ni, θ =NT ) = P (ri|ni, θ = P ). This assumption will be
relaxed later.
Then the posterior odds are
P (θ = 1|x)
P (θ = 0|x)
=
P (θ = 1)
P (θ = 0)
·
P (n|c, g, θ = 1)
P (n|c, g, θ = 0)
.
4.2. Distributions. First, we define the prior distribution. Feuerverger
estimates the number of tombs in the area to be about N = 1100. Also, let
the prior probability of the NT family having a tomb at all be t. Then
P (θ = 1) = t
1
N
, P (θ = 0) = 1−P (θ =NT ).
In order to be optimistic, we take t= 1 and get prior odds of
P (θ = 1)
P (θ = 0)
=
1
1099
.
This prior can be thought of as a Bayesian approach to account for data
snooping, that is, the potential to searching through many tombs.
For the null distribution, names are drawn randomly using the name
frequencies in Ilan. Men and women are being treated separately and the
list of names n is treated as unordered.
When specifying the probability distribution under the alternative, it is
necessary to weigh flexibility against complexity. Here we want to take the
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Table 1
Weights for each of the persons listed
Jesus
Scenario son of Joseph James Joses Matthew Judas Others
Neutral 20 3 3 62/2509 171/2509 3
Optimistic ∞ 1 1 62/2509 171/2509 0
Marya Mariam Salome
Scenario (mother) (sister) (sister) Mary Magdalene Others
Neutral 10 3 3 3 3
Optimistic ∞ 1 1 0 0
Drawing from the set is being done with probabilities proportional to the weights without
replacement. The weight in the “others” category is the weight for all not listed persons.
following approach: Specify a set of names from the NT family (separately for
men and women) and assign each name a weight as to how likely it is to find
this person in the NT family tomb. Then, the probability of a specific tomb
is calculated by drawing from the nameset without replacement according
to the weights. The weights can be determined in an optimistic or more
conservative fashion (see Table 1).
For simplicity, the probability of being in the generational ossuary is taken
to be the same for everyone, under the null as well as the alternative.1
Neutral scenario: In this case, we chose the weights in a fashion that
seemed reasonable to us when we do not consider the information gathered
from the tomb. Also, each name in the tomb is taken as its broad name
category and it is assumed that no additional information for special name
renditions is available for the NT family.
Neutral with special renditions: Here, we use the same weights as in
the neutral scenario, however account for the special “Mariamenou η Mara”
rendition. Each of the other inscriptions on the ossuaries is not special, so we
do not make any adjustments for those. A priori, we could not have known
the inscription “Mariamenou η Mara,” so how do we account for it? Under
θ = P , we assume that for the Marya name category, the probability of seeing
a new previously unseen name is 1/80. For θ =NT , we assume that special
name renditions are more likely, say 1/10. Assuming that ‘Mariamenou η
Mara’ could in some way be interpreted for Maria (mother), Mariam (sister)
and Maria Magdalena, this raises the odds by a factor 8 over the neutral
scenario.
Optimistic scenario: We also wanted to explore the effect of having very
optimistic assumptions which are to a large degree influenced by what has
1This may be viewed as an oversimplification, however as the weights provide ample
opportunity to fine tune prior beliefs, we do not see this as practically important.
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Table 2
Posterior probability that the Talpiyot tomb
belongs to the NT family under various scenarios
Scenario Probability
Neutral 3.4%
Neutral—special renditions 21.8%
Very optimistic 64.1%
been observed in the tomb. Jesus and his mother are taken to be in the tomb
for sure. For the rest of the men, the weights are equal for both brothers
and set to the normal name frequency in the population for Matthew and
Judas. The overall effect of this choice of weights is to effectively ignore the
Matthew and Judas ossuaries, assume that one of the ossuaries is from a
brother and one from a sister of Jesus and assign all eligible brothers and
sisters the same weight.
4.3. Results. Even in the optimistic scenario, there is only about a 60%
chance of the tomb belonging to the NT family. In the other two, more
realistic schemes, the probability is only 22% and 3% (see Table 2). Just as
Feuerverger, we also did not consider the generational part of the “Judas,
son of Jesus” ossuary. Including it in the analysis would be possible; however,
as prior beliefs about a possible son of Jesus are very strong, this may have
overwhelmed the rest of the analysis and therefore we decided to exclude it.
5. Conclusion. When asked to analyze these data, we suspect that many
statisticians would have said that the problem is too vague and would have
stopped there. We commend Andrey Feurverger for plunging in and doing
a serious analysis. Our analysis suggests that the finding does not lend sup-
port to the hypothesis that the find is indeed the tomb of the NT family.
Ultimately, scholars of history and archeology will judge the validity of the
claims about this find.
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